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committee of five to suggest additional names for the Board of Directors, the Executive Committee, and for Vice-Presidents.

The meeting adjourned at 3 o'clock p. m.

(Signed ARTHUR DEERIN CALL,
Secretary.)

IMMANUEL KANT AND THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF NATIONS

By PROFESSOR WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING

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(From Stenographer's Report of Ninety-sixth Annual Meeting of American Peace Society, First Congregational Church, Washington, D. C., May 23, 1924.)

PROFESSOR HOCKING. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: Two hundred years ago this evening, Immanuel Kant was a month and a day old, and I presume a more unpromising youngster few mothers of Königsberg had ever had. He was puny; he was a little crooked in his make-up; and he looked in a good many respects much as the peace movement has frequently looked to many people in the world since then. (Laughter.) Perhaps his subsequent history may be of some encouragement to us, and I am sure the nature of his thought is something that we can do well in spending an hour to consider.

Kant was seventy years old before he began to make any effective remarks about peace. His tractate *On Perpetual Peace* was written in 1795, when he was seventy-one years old. By that time his fellow-citizens in Königsberg had learned two things about this strange, fragile, punctilious old professor.

One was that he was a man of extraordinary intellectual power, and the other that he was (as we might put it) something of a Bolshevik. They did not in those days call them Bolsheviks; they called them Jacobins; and Kant had the reputation of being one of these dangerous liberals with radical leanings who sympathized in some respect with the French Revolution, and who therefore deserved the name of its extremist party.

I would like to call Kant's image a little more definitely before us by remarking on both of those points.

His fellow-townsmen had for the most part little interest in the strange,

metaphysical speculations of this man. They realized that fame was coming to him, because visitors flocked from outside to meet the man, who himself never went abroad. But they realized his intellectual power directly through his conversation. Kant was a man who gathered around his table not only thinkers, but observers, travelers, merchants, men who knew something about geography and of mankind in different parts of the world. Through his wide reading, his memory, and his imagination, he became, without ever having been outside the province, the best traveled man in Germany; and he so impressed those who conversed with him.

There is a story that on one occasion a visitor from China, after a talk with Kant, asked him how recently he had been in China, so well was he informed of conditions there. He was, in all reason, a citizen of the world—a *Weltbürger*.

Kant knew the world through the power of his imagination, but it was his humanitarianism which drew his particular interest to the revolutionary movements that were on foot during his time. He was greatly interested in the American Revolution. There is a tale to the effect that in the presence of an English acquaintance Kant once spoke so warmly in favor of the American Colonies that the loyal Englishman became highly irate and challenged Kant to a duel. Kant was not the person to indulge in duels, but he was the person to indulge in reasoning and persuasion; and he held forth calmly on the subject of the rights of the American Colonies with such effect that this Englishman, according to the story, was not only converted to the idea that the Colonies might have a defensible case, but became a lifelong friend of Kant as a consequence.

The French Revolution came much nearer home to Kant. The French Revolution had effects in his own town and neighborhood. He had already made the acquaintance of Rousseau and had become an ardent admirer of that stimulating thinker. He said of his writing, "The beauty of Rousseau's style is such that I have to read what he writes several times, so that I can forget the expression and begin to think about what the man says." Would that Kant had been able to find some further use for Rousseau's gifts of style than to forget them! (Laughter.)

But Rousseau influenced Kant much more deeply than simply on the surface. He gave a blow to Kant's pristine priggishness; for Kant in his youth, as a conscious and ambitious pursuer of truth, had felt that after all he was better than the common herd. A word or two in which he acknowledges his debt to Rousseau will show that this debt affects the fundamental articles of his faith.

He writes:

"By inclination I am myself an inquirer, feeling all of the thirst for knowledge and all of the eager unrest of striving to advance, as well as satisfaction with every kind of progress. There was a time when I thought all this could form the glory of mankind, and I despised the rabble who knew nothing. Rousseau has brought me to the right view. This blinding superiority vanished. I learned to honor man. And I would regard myself as much more useless than the common laborer did I not believe that this way of thinking could communicate a value to all others in establishing the rights of mankind."

Rousseau had thus sensitized Kant to think seriously of the French Revolution. And while the proceedings up to 1795 had filled him with horror, he was filled with something very much more than horror; for he saw here a unique exhibition of the belief of men in an idea, and their power to put this belief into very effective practice. He observed, too, a vein of enthusiasm in the onlookers. He felt in his own countrymen and those with whom he talked an almost instinctive tendency to sympathize with the revolutionists; and he felt, too, that in the armies in the State of Prussia that were being raised to join the coalition against

the French Republic there was a certain hesitation and unwillingness, a deficiency in morale, because of their doubt whether the French Revolution was not, after all, a righter sort of thing in the world than the Prussian Monarchy.

The French Revolution came home to Kant personally through the reaction of the government against it. Frederick William II was not the man that his predecessor had been. Frederick the Great had been a tolerant and thoughtful ruler, in spite of his Machiavellian statecraft. He believed in Kant. He was interested in Kant's thought. Frederick William II was a man timorous toward ideas on account of the principles that underlay his throne, and one who looked at the French Revolution with growing alarm. He did not like what happened to monarchs in France, and he thought he saw that bad philosophy was at the root of it. He thought that liberal views in religion were especially at fault here, and he began in set ways to move against those persons in the universities whose religious views were somewhat more liberal than he thought they ought to be.

So from 1792 onward Kant felt the approach of the censorship. On March 5 of that year an edict went forth to the effect that "irreverent criticism of the law of the land will hereafter be severely punished," and in October, 1794, a Royal Cabinet order came to Kant in person, urging him very courteously not to teach along lines which might be subversive of the religious foundations of the kingdom.

Kant replied in the spirit of loyal obedience; while declaring that he would not say anything contrary to his belief, he promised he would hold his religious views in silence—at least until such time as the reigning monarch should have disappeared from the scene.

But Kant also felt the Revolution in still another way. In 1795 the coalition armies had been brought to a standstill by the armies of the French Republic. Prussia felt obliged to make a separate peace. The Peace of Basle had been drawn up in April of that year; and that peace was one which, while giving the French Republic virtual recognition, also handed over to France territories on the left bank of the Rhine. This was a tentative promise, so far as the published

treaty was concerned; but there was a secret clause to this effect, that if the Empire made over to France its own territories, Prussia would do likewise, and find or take compensation in some other quarter!

Now, there was a good deal of whispering abroad in Prussia. Kant, while out of sympathy with the coalition, and vehemently critical toward England, whose gold was largely financing it, shared the indignation at this treaty on account of the surrender of territory, the secrecy of the proceeding, and the menace of future war involved in it. He wrote his tractate *On Perpetual Peace* largely as a protest against the principles of that treaty.

. . .

May I say a word or two about the character, the external character, of this extraordinary writing? Its title, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, Kant says he took from the signboard of a Dutch inn keeper, who, having adopted this device, had painted underneath it the picture of a graveyard as a satirical invitation to wayfarers. Kant adopts this motto for his own document by way of suggesting that we must aim at eternal peace through reason, or else we shall surely reach it by way of the universal graveyard of mankind.

The tractate held throughout, so far as its form is concerned, a semi-ironical vein, which appears, among other respects, in a certain imitation of the manner of diplomatic documents. Here are the "Preliminary Articles," six of them. Here are the "Definite Articles"; and here, if you please, is a "Secret Article."

Now, the "Secret Article" is a whimsical whisper between Kant and his government to this effect: "Governments ought to consult philosophers about what they are going to do." Now, this does not mean, Kant explains, that philosophers ought to be brought to the council table. It means simply that philosophers ought to be invited and encouraged to express themselves freely, because if they do express themselves freely in public, then of course all that they say is accessible to the government, and the government need not tell anybody that it is listening to the philosopher, nor inform anybody how far it intends to follow the philosopher's advice. He reassures the rulers that if

philosophers be granted this liberty, they will form no club of Jacobins, inasmuch as it is more than they can do to keep peace among themselves. Kant's "Secret Article" thus amounts to a plea for his own freedom of speech, a tacit request that he shall be allowed as a philosopher to speak his mind. This fact suggests that he felt a little uneasy about the acceptableness at court of the contents of his tractate, an uneasiness which would hardly have been allayed by the fact that the tractate was promptly translated into French and acclaimed at Paris as professing adherence to the principles of the Revolution. He had some reason to feel uneasy, as we shall recognize as we turn now to review those contents.

. . .

First of all, a treatise on peace implies some judgment about war. Kant had already expressed views on this subject. In 1784 he had published a short essay called "An idea for a general history of the world," and in that essay he had made war out to be, or rather to have been, an important factor in the development of mankind.

War, he explains, is an expression of our self-assertive nature, the "unsocial sociability of man." This self-assertive instinct leads everybody to try to take possession of the powers and opinions of everybody else. Of what worth would a man be if his will did not overflow, and if he did not feel that he could control others besides himself? Now, those whom we wish to control are precisely those with whom our social instinct leads us to unite; and since the impulse to exert control is mutual, we are led into antagonism and conflict, an unsocial sociability of relationship. And when this relationship exists between different societies we have war.

Now, this contest of wills, whether within or without a given society, has certain beneficial results. It stimulates our powers. It wakes us up. It destroys indolence. "Man wishes concord, but Nature knows better what is good for his species." It develops talents. It brings out an erect and stalwart growth of mankind, like that of the trees in the forest that are competing with each other for sunshine and air. If you plant the trees

thickly, up they go, straight, making clear wood for the builder, and putting out few lateral branches. But if you have but one, and plant it alone in the field, it grows at its will, crooked and broad, and loses shape and availability. So Nature has planted men thickly, has led them into competition with each other, and has brought them thereby into a taller and straighter growth.

Then, too, the competitive struggle begins to force man together into groups. It creates solidarity. Civil society in its origins is very largely an effect of warfare. And the existence of war, together with the need of peace, has dispersed mankind, driving them into the remote parts of the earth. The settlement of the earth's surface is largely due to the fact that warring tribes have split other tribes apart, sending the Finns up into the north of Russia, sending the Eskimos up toward the North Pole, and so forth. Thus war has taught man in what strange regions he can live and live successfully.

But war ends by making itself unnecessary and unwelcome. The last service of war is to strangle itself. Kant saw that, even in this earlier writing of his. He saw that, among other evils, the enormous cost of war was eating out the cultural life of the nation. Frederick the Great, interested and learned as he was, was too much of a warrior to support his university liberally, and Kant, together with all of the other professors of Prussia, felt the pinch when it came to the budget for the university. It is the nature of war to exhaust national energy into itself, and thus to check the growth which it first fostered. But when he wrote in 1795 on *Perpetual Peace*, he knew more of war, he was more conscious of its evils, and he wrote with a much more definite and clear-cut condemnation of the process.

It was the *methods* of warfare which struck Kant at this time with peculiar abhorrence. It was the inherent crookedness of war that impressed him. He was not thinking so much of the activities of the private soldier as of the activities of the statesmen and diplomats who bring wars to pass, and of the strategists who conduct them. Warfare is shot through with the practice of deception; and if Kant was fanatical on any point, it was on the necessity of truthfulness among

men as a foundation for all social relations. Warfare would hardly be itself without trickery, espionage, breach of faith. But this deception in the field is merely the overt continuance of the principles of a war-breeding statescraft. Kant formulates these principles with precise pedantry. (1) "*Fac et excusa*": Do a thing, take what you want, and let the *fait accompli* be the apology for the deed. (2) "*Si fecisti nega*": If you have committed an outrage, deny that you were its author, make it appear that the treachery or malice of others forced you to do as you did in self-defense. (3) "*Divide et impera*": Split your enemy and conquer his fragments severally—a maxim equally useful in the field and in the councils of state. Thus Kant states in advance the principles of the *Realpolitik* of a later day, and exhibits its internal corruption. War in its method is the offspring of the Father of Lies, and this must be symptomatic of its essence.

It is the essence of war to summon force to decide questions of justice—a task for which force has no pertinence. And it is incidental to the processes of war to treat human beings, not only of other States, but of one's own State, as mere means to those ends of war which they may neither comprehend nor care for—mere grist for the mill of death which controlling classes grind for the fancied benefit of the State. And in Kant's view, the use of humanity as a mere means to another's ends is the essence of moral wrong.

And all these evils of war, as Kant came to see it, are multiplied by the fact that it is *self-propagating*. The arrangements we call treaties of peace are not such in reality. They are truces. They leave the possibilities of future war precisely where they were; and more often than not their provisions contain in them the seeds of future war, as was sharply illustrated by the so-called Peace of Basle. No real peace can come until men devise measures not alone to stop individual wars, but to put an end to the business of warfare itself.

The time had now come, Kant felt, for a definitive rational effort in this direction. He felt himself called to take an initiative in that work; for who among men then living could more clearly see the necessity of the task, lay bare the

nature of war, arouse faith in the possibility of a conclusive peace, or set forth the necessary steps for bringing it to pass?

Now I must confess to you that if Kant's tractate had been submitted to the Bok Peace Award Committee it would not have received the prize. (Laughter.) It was not drawn up, in spite of its formal flourish, with the purpose of meeting a specific situation in a specific way. It is a document of principles. I do not think it less important on that account. On a task of such magnitude, there must be those who labor at clarifying principles, as well as those who labor at applying them. And the former workers have the important function of reaching the minds of the multitudes of thinking people, in whose insight and sentiment all enduring peace must be born. These multitudes cannot deal with the details of actual constitutions, but they are concerned with the principles on which they are founded. Let me therefore restate to you, not in their exact language, but in their purport, the principles which Kant ventured to recommend to the consideration of mankind in his day, beginning with the "Preliminary Articles."

These "Preliminary Articles" may be regarded as a series of reforms which may be undertaken while war is still with us, and which may lead to the creation of a state of public mind in which final peace-making is possible.

The first is that there shall be *no secret reservations in treaties*; for it is here that seeds of future wars lie concealed. This article seems to anticipate the first of Wilson's Fourteen Points.

Second, there shall be *no disposal of national territory as if it were the property of the sovereign*, as by trading it off, selling it off, transmitting it by bequest or gift. It must be recognized that the domain of a State is a part of the life of a nation; it is inseparable from the lives and interests of men and families and cannot be altered in its destiny without their consent.

Third, *in time we must dismiss all standing armies*—anticipating in part Wilson's Fourteenth Point and Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

"No more standing armies"—why? Kant had in mind not alone the invitation to war which lies in the fact of a standing army, but also the anomalous moral position of the professional soldier. The soldier who belongs to a standing army is committed in advance to fighting for whatever cause the government may adopt. He does not choose his cause. As one of our own officers once put the case: "I am a hired butcher. It is not my business to form any opinion about the thing for which I am fighting. It is my business to fight; and if I am told to fight I shall do so." Now, Kant objected to any such commitment in advance. He did believe in citizens drilling for warfare voluntarily, preparing themselves for a war of defense in case they were needed; and he recognized that disarmament must be general and gradual, not local and immediate. But he believed that disarmament must precede a genuine peace.

Fourth, *no credits shall be raised for promoting external aggressive policies*. Fiscal disarmament must accompany military disarmament—the war-chest must go.

Fifth, *no intervention* in the internal affairs of States, not even in case of civil war. Let each State wrestle with its own internal maladies; for its own cures are better than any cures imposed by force from outside.

Sixth, *no war usages shall be tolerated which diminish confidence between combatants for future peace*. Such usages are the incitement to treason, guerrilla warfare, poisoning, the breaking of treaties. Kant also mentions espionage in a very obscure sentence; and I am not quite sure whether he means that no spies are to be employed in warfare. Some of his translators think that he intended to abolish them. But in any case the usages of war, he maintains, must be such that you can still continue to believe in the humanity and worth of your opponents; for without such belief the possibility of true peace is absent, and every war should, in all logic, be a war of extermination.

So much for the "Preliminary Articles." Now for the "Definitive Articles," namely, those which contain Kant's idea of the actual establishment of peace. For peace must be instituted; it will not grow of itself.

There are three such articles. The first of them is that *the constitution of all States must be republican*. This statement sounds like one of extreme boldness, when we consider that Kant was living under the monarchy of Prussia. But Kant immediately proceeds to define what he means by "republican." He does not mean by a republic a State in which the mass of the people assume the executive function or right. He means a State in which the legislature is representative, and presumably expresses the wishes of the people. And he assumes that this parliament will so far control such public acts as war-making that it shall be the people themselves who decide upon it, and not simply the government.

It is evident that he expects by this article to bring war to a prompt close by choking off its source, on the ground that people will not vote themselves into the miseries which war brings. Kant's analysis, as we can now see, is not entirely correct here, because we have had enough experience with republics of his sort since that time to know that they also are capable of being carried away by warlike passions. We know, too, that in republics, as in other States, it is still the official body that orders the fighting; and in campaigns like that of the Dardanelles or the Argonne the private soldier still feels himself in the grasp of forces over which he can exercise no effective control. But Kant's views are correct to this extent, that republics find fewer causes for war than States which are organized in such a way that popular judgment can be relatively disregarded. And the prospects of educating the popular judgment to the control of passion are more hopeful than those of educating princes whose interest or ambition may urge toward expansion.

The second of these Definitive Articles is this:

"There must be a Federation of Free States pledged to support certain principles of public right."

Kant believes that the same logic must ultimately drive States into a legal union as impel individuals to the formation or support of individual States. If we scorn savages because they prefer the freedom of nature to the freedom that mankind have in civil society—if we call them rude and brutal because they prefer to live in

their own way—why is it, he asks, that we judge civilized States less severely when they prefer to live in this same state of nature with reference to each other?

I am going to take the liberty of putting Kant's meaning into language which Kant does not use. The chief obstacle to this Federation of Free States, in Kant's Time as in our own, was a certain conception of State freedom which we call "sovereignty," and which he sometimes refers to as "Majestät." The notion of sovereignty is commonly so interpreted as to make it appear that any submission by an independent State to a rule of justice, which as international would be independent of its own resolution, would be an abrogation of its own statehood. States hesitate to accept international usage as *law*. There is evidently no law-making body. There is evidently no international force. How, then, can international usage be law in any definite sense of the term? But Kant points out with unanswerable cogency that there is the same alternative before States as before individuals: either you secure your rights by law of some sort, or else you secure them by force. No State can take the position of letting its rights go. Then, if it will not let its rights go, and if its conception of sovereignty precludes an appeal to some source of objective justice, it must fight for them.

Per contra, if war is wrong, then this conception of sovereignty is wrong. But war, which is a contest of forces, is utterly condemned by reason as a method of settling contests of right. War is wrong, and therefore this conception of sovereignty is wrong—a doctrine that I should like to commend to certain members of the United States Senate—particularly, I regret to say, to the senior Senator from Massachusetts, whose influence on international affairs for six years past seems to me to have been an almost unmixed calamity to the nation. (Applause.)

If war is wrong, this conception of sovereignty is wrong. And not only this conception of sovereignty, but also the attitude of *laissez faire* which it fosters with reference to the international situation. For it is not merely warfare that reason must condemn; it is the condition out of which war must come. It is re-

maintaining in the state of nature with reference to each other that is wrong and which must be corrected. It is absolutely wrong to remain in a situation in which right can only be sustained by force.

One might think by what Kant has said, following his logic, that he would have to advocate a world State—that is to say, a world government. And, as a matter of fact, both in the treatise of 1784 and in his treatise on the metaphysics of Law of 1796, Kant does allow his argument to carry him far in that direction.

But why not accept this conclusion unreservedly? There is still something in that notion of sovereignty that resists the notion of a world State. Kant cannot bring himself to eliminate sovereignty entirely; he hesitates to put rulers in the position of being over-ruled, so that they are no longer rulers. He gives different reasons for this hesitation which show he is not quite reconciled to it. He suggests in one place that it is simply a general (and irrational) unwillingness of mankind that renders a world government Utopian. But again he alleges the psychological fact that law weakens as territory expands; so that if you undertook to make law for the entire world it would spread out too thin. Its force would fail as it bore on particular localities. He speaks, further, about the boundaries of nations—how many times States have undertaken to control other States and have failed to do so because limits of agreement in language and religion have imposed limits of political understanding—and then he suggests that probably the whole world is stronger if we do not attempt to submit all States to a single State, but leave their differences standing. The differences of States should, perhaps, be balanced against one another rather than cancelled in a universal order.

We can understand the source of Kant's perplexity. It is evident to us today, after the discussion of the 19th century, that he was touching upon the idea of *nationality*. He feels its force, but he is unable to formulate its principles. His sense for the claims of nationality is sufficiently strong, so that he discards the world State as an undesirable ideal.

What, then, is the thing that he proposes in place of the world State? A Federation of Free States. It is not to

be a fixed Federation, like the United States of America. He says explicitly that the federation must be subject to renewal from time to time, and to dissolution at the will of its members. If any party is unsatisfied, it may withdraw. It is to begin with a nucleus of States, and then it is to be open to any neighboring State to join. In his treatise of 1796 he adds: "We might call it a *continuous congress of nations*."

"A continuous congress of nations"—an extraordinary phrase, it seems to me, almost an anticipatory description of the League of Nations. But Kant does not tell us enough of its specific program to determine whether it is to be primarily a league or a court—an international court. He mentions an instance of an assembly that took place in the early part of the 18th century at The Hague, an assembly of various States-general of Europe, in which the mind of Europe reached a momentary organization, passing common judgment on the issues before that assembly, and in which each State there met realized that its case was going to be judged not solely upon the basis of its own force, but upon the basis of a common sense of justice. He regarded this event not alone as a practical illustration of his meaning, but as evidence of its feasibility. Here we may leave this second article for a moment and turn to the third of these Definitive Articles, which relates to the rights of "world citizens."

The World-citizen, or *Weltbürger*—a being whom we have already met in Kant's own person in his capacity as mental globe-trotter, and whom we think of, perhaps, as chiefly incarnate in the explorer, the traveler, and the trader—is here understood by Kant, not as a special class of person, but as every man; for all persons, he thinks, have certain claims on all the world. Starting from the fact that the earth is round, and therefore the amount of space in the world is limited, he judges that the accident of being first in any place ought not to create an absolute right of property in land, either for individuals or nations. Every one of us ought to have some right to every spot on the earth's surface.

But, comforting as this assurance must be to all of us, the important point for international order is to define explicitly

how far these rights extend. *They are limited*, says Kant, in this third article, *to the rights of hospitality*.

The rights of hospitality, as he understands them, are the rights to go visiting and to do trading without being molested, robbed, or deprived of elementary justice. I must be permitted to travel, and to make contracts. If I find something I like, I may offer to buy it. That shall not be taken as an offense. I may trade. But the rights of the world citizen, explorer, adventurer, merchant, are not to go beyond that. They are *not to include the right of appropriation or dictation*.

It is evident that these rights have been interpreted so as to be fruitful causes of war. The inhospitality of savages has been broken down, the reluctance of backward peoples has been answered by a ruthless self-assertion on the part of the alleged civilized. Kant speaks very feelingly about the kind of expansionism which was prevalent in his own day, not entirely different in principle from the expansionism that we know at present, although his instances were different. He takes his examples from America—the treatment of the Indians here by some of our explorers; from Africa, the Spice Islands, the Cape; he speaks particularly of the treachery in East India, whereby, in guise of traders, soldiers were landed and dissension sown among the native tribes; he praises the wisdom of China and Japan in resisting this kind of intrusion.

And he makes this declaration, which now, 130 years later, we are just beginning to recognize as true:

“Since now the community among the peoples of the earth has come to be so close that *a breach of right in one part is felt in all parts*, a definition of the right of world citizens has become necessary.”

. . .

This is the substance of the tractate on Perpetual Peace. A few comments may now be offered.

There is obvious criticism; I think we would all agree in making it. Kant has not met the problem of sovereignty completely, because he has not seen the full force of the interest in nationality. The analogy between the State and the individual is not as perfect and as simple as Kant assumes. The principles are the

same, since in each case free wills are dealing with free wills. Here he is right. But the situations are profoundly different, and every friend of peace will wish to face these essential differences between States and individuals in order not to minimize the obstacles which we have before us.

In the first place, a society of nations is much smaller in number than any ordinary society of individuals, and the individual differences between the members of that society are greater. Each State is unique to a degree in which individuals are hardly unique. States are geographically unique. Their vital interests are correspondingly different; no other State can have precisely England's concern in the high seas, nor America's concern in the Western Continent. Further, they have a kind of fixity of position that we individuals do not have. If we do not like neighbors, we can move away, physically leaving them; but if the United States should ever cease to like Canada as a neighbor, or if Mexico should fail to like us as a neighbor, neither can leave the place, nor induce the other to go away. We are obliged to live as neighbors. And, furthermore, there is no free play between us. If you do not like me, you can urge me, at any rate, to get farther over; but States are commonly separated by nothing but an imaginary line.

Again, “property” and “existence” mean different things in the two cases. The property of a State means both more and less than the property of the individual. It means more; for, as we have seen, it means citizenship. But it also means less; for you can transfer the property of a State to another State without any loss to the property of the individual members of that transferred territory—not the slightest.

Then, again, all questions between States are likely to reduce to questions of existence, because no one can tell quite what is going to turn up in the world situation tomorrow. Every small advantage has, therefore, an unknown importance. And, finally, self-sacrifice means something very different in the case of States from what it means in the case of individuals. A man may sacrifice himself alone, but a State cannot sacrifice

"its self" without sacrificing its members. Indeed, the State has no self apart from the selves of its members, and has no soul of its own.

These differences require us to think. They are not differences which lead us to say that the morals between States must be different in character from the morals between individuals; but they are problems which we cannot dispose of by merely referring to the Ten Commandments as a rule for States and individuals alike. To my mind, the conception of sovereignty is a provisional conception, which must remain as a check to progress in international relations until such time as these differences are fully grasped and provided for. So much, then, for what seems to me the weak point in Kant's position.

. . .

Now let us turn to its elements of greatness and permanent validity. Kant's greatness consists in his power to reach directly what is essential in any case, and to formulate the first principles for dealing with it. In the case of peace, he has shed a flood of light on the problem by cutting it away from the insoluble tangle of expediency, practicability, precedent, etc., and bringing it at once into the court of human right and duty, where it belongs.

Kant rests his case upon the ultimate moral principle, the "categorical imperative"—i. e., that moral rule which commands without an "if." It is the inescapable and unquestionable duty of every man to "Treat humanity, whether in yourself or in another, always as an end in itself and never as a means only." This is a wonderful formulation; it cuts the ground at once from under many historical evils—from under slavery, from under prostitution, from under warfare as a method of national self-assertion—for all of these involve exploiting humanity as a means to other ends than its own.

Now this categorical imperative marks out the duty of the individual; but in Kant's hands it becomes the source of the principle of public right. The political order has to realize right in external matters of behavior (which alone can be controlled by law). The inner law of duty requires equal respect for the moral element in all men; the external law of

right requires their *equal freedom*. The goal of all politics is to provide that every man may be free to do "whatever is compatible with the equal freedom of others, according to a universal law." This freedom requires the supremacy of legal justice in the world, and must ultimately put an end to every appeal to force.

Now the notion of individual freedom was in the air of Kant's time. It was a part of the spirit of the great revolutions and of the enlightenment out of which they came. Was Kant, perhaps, only taking the prevalent idea of the "natural rights" of man and drawing from it the corollary of a demand for universal peace? So to interpret Kant is to miss the secret of his power. As Dean Pound has well pointed out, the idea of natural right, as disseminated by Locke, Rousseau, and others, had previously played a rôle of great social utility. The new commerce and the new industry were in extraordinary need of a conception which would enable men to separate themselves from old social ties without losing the fundamental ties of right and duty to each other; it was necessary that men should be able to regard themselves as related not by ties of feudal status or other traditional belongings, but by ties of free contract. In the changing world opened by commerce, exploration, and industry, it was less important to keep men in their old places than to give them a sanction for being moral and legal entities, *while places changed*. The human being, and not the group, was to be the unit of the new society; and he was to be a detachable unit. He must have rights that were transportable from place to place, from employer to employer, and from institution to institution. This was precisely what inherent "natural rights" permitted him; the natural-rights man inevitably carried his rights with him, like so many chemical valencies, and they enabled him to confront changing social situations with a certain moral stability. There was thus a profound economic reason for the vogue of the doctrine of natural rights.

But I must point out, at the risk of differing from Dean Pound, that neither Locke nor Rousseau nor Kant believed in human rights for reasons of these social utilities: the utilities were incidental.

They believed in rights because they were right; and the age then used them because they were useful. But Kant alone was fully conscious of this situation; he alone singled out the element of right and made it expressly paramount over utility. His view of human freedom and equality came from his metaphysical view of the nature of the universe—ultimately, no doubt, from his Pietistic inheritance—as a place where the moral order is the supreme order and the moral capacity of man his supreme trait. In such an order, right determines what is useful, not utility what is right. By the clearness with which he asserted this, Kant separated himself from the Enlightenment, and inaugurated a new era in thought.

I will pass over a number of subordinate principles of statecraft suggested by Kant which seem to me shrewd and wise, and come to the thing which I think is the most important message which Kant has for us today—that is, his *rational confidence in the outcome*. Because it is our duty to bring about this new international situation, the task is always a hopeful task.

Grotius had had visions of international peace. Rousseau had thought of these things in substance. So had Voltaire. So had the Abbé de Saint Pierre. But they had dreamed of them with vacillating hope or none. When Voltaire went to Frederick the Great and reported to him, "Rousseau has written a flaming tractate, declaring that all that is necessary to bring war to an end is that princes shall lay aside their ambitious projects and cease to be self-indulgent and self-centered." Frederick the Great put on his cynical smile and said, "Is that all?" (Laughter.)

It was a general disbelief in the possibility of peace that Rousseau faced, and Kant faced nothing less when he wrote. But Kant saw, and truly said, that history furnishes us no argument about what is possible and what is impossible. History shows, rather, that the alleged impossible is the thing that is happening from time to time. The French Revolution meant to Kant that that which no diplomat had ever believed possible was possible—that an ideal should upset an ancient State. And he finely observed the meaning of the

psychological forces there at work. It was enthusiasm that worked the miracle. And men are capable of enthusiasm about something which demands self-sacrifice. As for what promises them profit, men can be eager about it, but not enthusiastic, for enthusiasm is a fundamentally moral emotion. Here Kant's psychology is absolutely right. And the historical possibilities of this moral emotion are never exhausted.

Kant points out that this moral passion is not without a helper. Nature itself makes for the end of war. A race of devils would be driven to devise a civil order among themselves; the race of men must be impelled, if only by commercial greed, by the need of markets, by the fear of misery or of possible extinction, to devise some alternative to war. Other forces within the logic of history are working in the same direction. Sophistication of mankind gradually defeats the practises of deception; the practised morality of statesmen must gradually approximate the professible morality; and men will be brought to see that "all actions touching the rights of other men which do not allow of *publicity* are wrong." It will also be perceived that the attitude of potential hostility to neighbor States is incompatible with the legal order within the State; that selfishness in international conduct inevitably reflects itself in the behavior of citizens toward each other; so that there can be no sound State which remains selfishly aloof or passive toward the creation of international righteousness.

But no one knows how powerful these forces may be, nor what counter-forces may work against them. We cannot calculate the course of history objectively; there is no prudential way to peace. The one effective force in this direction lies in the consciousness that we ought to create peace; and *because we ought, we can*. It is absurd, says Kant, to suppose that anything can be morally right and not practical; for morality is the very essence of the practicable. The calculation of expediency loses itself in infinite complication; the fact of duty stands simple. Do justice, enact peace, make righteousness possible in the world; then all these other things will be added unto you.

Then Kant makes a suggestion. If a powerful and avowed republic were to take the lead in these things—were to make itself the nucleus of an organization of States—we should find other States assembling around it, and we should find this Federation of Free States beginning to exist. Is there a “powerful and avowed republic,” that can remain indifferent to this possibility?

“If, therefore,”—I quote from Kant’s treatise—“If, therefore, there is a duty

to further public right, and if there is a well grounded hope to approximate it, then eternal peace is no empty idea, but it is a necessary task whose accomplishment draws continually nearer.” We have no right to give world history over to the play of a statecraft based upon force. We have no right to give up the effort to bring these United States into a position where international justice must be thought out and not merely fought out. (Applause.)

BUSINESS ETHICS *

By HERBERT HOOVER

Secretary of Commerce

THE advancement of science and our increasing population require constantly new standards of conduct and breed an increasing multitude of new rules and regulations. The basic principles laid down in the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount are as applicable today as when they were declared, but they require a host of subsidiary clauses. The ten ways to evil in the time of Moses have increased to ten thousand now.

A whole host of rules and regulations is necessary to maintain human rights, with this amazing transformation into an industrial era. Ten people in a whole county, with a plow apiece, did not elbow each other very much. But when we put seven million people in a county, with the tools of electricity, steam, 30-floor buildings, telephones, miscellaneous noises, street cars, railways, motors, stock exchanges, and what-not, then we do jostle each other in a multitude of directions. Thereupon our lawmakers supply the demand by the ceaseless piling up of statutes in attempts to keep the traffic open; to assure fair dealing in the economic world; to eliminate its wastes; to prevent some kind of abuse or some kind of domination. Moreover, with increasing education, our senses become more offended and our moral discrimination increases; for all of which we discover new things to remedy. In

one of our States over 1,000 laws and ordinances have been added in the last eight months. It is also true that a large part of them will sleep peacefully in the statute book.

The question we need to consider is whether these rules and regulations are to be developed solely by government or whether they cannot be in some large part developed out of voluntary forces in the nation. In other words, can the abuses which give rise to government in business be eliminated by the systematic and voluntary action of commerce and industry itself? This is indeed the thought behind the whole gamut of recent slogans—“Less Government in Business,” “Less Government Regulation,” “A Square Deal,” “The Elimination of Waste,” “Better Business Ethics”—and a dozen others.

National character cannot be built by law. It is the sum of the moral fiber of its individuals. When abuses which rise from our growing system are cured by live individual conscience, by initiative in the creation of voluntary standards, then is the growth of moral perceptions fertilized in every individual character.

No one disputes the necessity for constantly new standards of conduct in relation to all these tools and inventions. Even our latest great invention—radio—has brought a host of new questions. No one disputes that much of these subsidiary additions to the Ten Commandments must be made by legislation. Our public utili-

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